Dynamic Team Training by Boland, E.J. et al.
UNCLASSIFIED 
Executive summary 
 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
 
  
This report is based on a presentation held at the I/ITSEC Conference, Orlando, 
December 2012. 
 
Report no. 
NLR-TP-2012-266 
 
Author(s) 
E.J. Boland 
C. Roos 
J. van der Pal 
 
Report classification 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Date 
April 2013  
 
Knowledge area(s) 
Training, Missiesimulatie en 
Operator Performance 
Onbemande luchtvaartuigen 
    
Descriptor(s) 
training 
team 
decision making 
tactical 
UAV 
     
Dynamic Team Training 
Improving Tactical Team Decision Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem area 
In order to enhance the tactical 
decision making process, all air 
operation team players need to be 
alert and share information or 
concerns just in time. Earlier studies 
apply the mnemonic DESIDE 
(Detect, Estimate, Set, Identify, Do, 
Evaluate) to teach individual pilots 
to optimize their flight safety 
decision making process. This study 
seeks to optimise team decision 
making in tactical processes and 
investigates the applicability of the 
DESIDE to do so. 
 
Description of work 
In this paper, DESIDE has been 
applied in a team setting for the first 
time. The mnemonic was not 
adjusted but a procedure to test the 
effectiveness of the tactical decision 
making mnemonic for teams was 
introduced. For that purpose, Falcon 
4 gamers were asked to perform 
five tactical missions in simulators. 
Each team consisted of two “fighter 
jet pilots” and one supporting 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
operator. If required, information 
from a Rivet Joint fighter controller 
and Mission Command was 
provided by experiment leaders. 
The DESIDE approach was 
compared to a more standard Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) 
training, similar in content to the 
CRM training received in the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF). 
The quality of the decision process 
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and outcome was monitored and 
compared between the teams. The 
MilNOTECHS (Military NOn 
TEChnical Skills) behavioural 
marker system in combination with 
the RNLAF rating scheme was used 
to evaluate decision making process 
quality. A former F-16 Weapon 
Instructor Pilot rated mission 
quality and success. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The results indicate that the 
DESIDE tool for decision making is 
promising for teams in a military 
context. It does generate improved 
decision making process quality in 
teams of F-16s and a UAS, 
performing air operation missions.   
 
Applicability 
The DESIDE tool is expected to be 
applicable for operational military 
teams in situations that allow for 
some time for going through the 
process steps and for 
communicating those steps. 
DESIDE may be useful to stimulate 
a conscious team decision making 
process during qualification training 
to ensure it is instilled for later 
stages in a military career. 
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Summary 
There is an increasing focus on precision and effectiveness for current and foreseen air 
operations. This requires a highly flexible team operation. Teams have to deal with the dynamic 
situation at hand in a coordinated way and be able to perform unplanned assignments. In order 
to enhance the decision making process, all air operation team players need to be alert and share 
information or concerns just in time. Earlier studies apply the mnemonic DESIDE (Detect, 
Estimate, Set, Identify, Do, Evaluate) to teach pilots to optimize their individual flight safety 
decision making process. In this paper, DESIDE will be applied by a team of three to test the 
effectiveness of the tactical decision making tool for teams. For that purpose, eight teams of 
Falcon 4 gamers were asked to perform a set of five tactical missions in simulators. Each team 
consists of two “fighter jet pilots” and one supporting Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
operator. In the control condition, a team will receive a short classical Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training, similar in content to the CRM training received in the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF). In the experimental condition a team will receive a short 
training in the use of the DESIDE decision making tool (Murray, 1997). Over the course of five 
tactical missions, the subjects learn to apply DESIDE. In each debrief, the team is given 
feedback on the decision making process (according to the instruction received) and mission 
outcome by a former F-16 Weapons Instructor. The quality of the decision process and outcome 
will be monitored over the five sessions to discover a learning curve and compared among the 
teams. The MilNOTECHS (Military NOn TEChnical Skills) behavioural marker system in 
combination with the RNLAF MilNOTECHS rating scheme was used to evaluate decision 
making. The results indicate that the DESIDE tool for decision making is effective for teams in 
a military context. It does generate improved tactical decision making process quality in teams 
of F-16s and a UAS, performing air operation missions.   
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Abbreviations 
ADM Aeronautical Decision Making 
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
DM Decision Making 
DHC Defence Helicopter Command 
DESIDE Detect, Estimate, Set, Identify, Do, Evaluate 
DTT Dynamic Team Training 
F4S Fighter 4 Ship (simulator) 
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1 Introduction 
The important role of good decision making in aviation safety is widely recognized. Decision 
making is a complex psychological construct in civil aviation, and more so in military aviation. 
Even though there are obvious commercial goals in civil aviation, the number one priority is 
safety. Risky situations are to be avoided. Safety, even though it has a high priority, is just one 
of the outcomes in military aviation. Military pilots are constantly training for, and sometimes 
operating in, hostile environments, actually flying into high risk situations. Military air 
operation team members are usually dispersed in the air, flying single seat aircraft and 
coordinating with personnel on the ground, for example UAS operators. This dispersion 
enhances the complexity of an otherwise already complex team operation. 
 
For current and foreseen air operations, there is an increasing focus on precision and 
effectiveness. Incidents, accidents, collateral damage, fratricide and loss of weapons need to be 
prevented. This requires, next to military specific measures such as real time updates on intel 
(intelligence), a highly flexible team operation, able to make correct and timely decisions. 
Teams have to deal with the situation at hand in a co-ordinated way, and be able to perform 
unplanned assignments. Higher operational demands require more precision and timely action 
from the team. Changes relative to the expected situation need to be detected and analysed. 
Based on this analysis, options need to be generated that focus on achieving the mission 
objectives while minimizing the risks involved. How can training influence these cognitive 
processes? 
 
This paper describes a new concept for air operations team decision making training intended to 
enhance team and operational efficiency and effectiveness. The effectiveness of this training 
concept has been evaluated in an experimental setup. With the experiment we tested the 
following hypotheses: 
 
1.  Using the DESIDE acronym for decision making within teams in highly complex, 
dynamic environments positively influences the quality of the decision making process 
over current standard CRM approaches. 
 
2.  A higher quality decision making process will have a subsequent positive effect on 
mission output. Quality is evaluated on the dimensions of situation assessment, risk 
management and option generation. 
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2 Team work and team training 
Almost any complex task or organizational goal requires a group of specialized individuals to 
succeed in an efficient and safe way. The teamwork required is usually facilitated by rules and 
procedures issued by the organisation or a higher authority (e.g., national legislation). In part, 
rules and procedures define team work: how and when information is gathered, processed, and 
coordinated and how to make decisions and take actions. While rules and procedures are useful 
and needed, they cannot cover all the dynamic and unpredictable situations in which teams may 
operate. Yet, teams need to be prepared for such ill-defined situations. An example of such a 
situation is, a two ship F-16 formation encountering air threats heading for friendly ground 
troops while en route towards a high priority moving ground target monitored by a UAV. This 
situation formed one of the missions executed by our participants. 
 
Accurate competency descriptions are needed to ensure that training designed for team work 
focuses on the appropriate set of skills, knowledge and attitudes and ensure that learning 
environments provide appropriately realistic work conditions and circumstances.  
 
Competencies are defined as integral sets of knowledge, skills, and attitudes as needed to 
perform operational tasks given defined operational conditions and standards (Abma & van 
Bavelgem, 2004). A team competency is a competency that is associated with the behaviour and 
the results of a team as a whole. Most team competencies do not supersede the individual level. 
When a person has ‘good team skills’, this reflects the skills for the individual, not the group. 
However, applying these individual competencies requires the team to function as a whole. 
Examples of team competencies are the attitude ‘team cohesion’ (degree to which team 
members value being a team member), or a ‘shared mental model’ knowledge structure such as 
knowing each other’s roles and responsibilities.  
 
Team related competencies may be very diverse and complex. To facilitate research and 
applications, many scholars have suggested team competency taxonomies. These taxonomies 
differ in terms of generality and completeness and their usefulness is often restricted to a 
particular application (kind of evaluation, kind of research, type of training). Most taxonomies 
divide team competencies in Technical (task-work related) & Non-technical (team-work related: 
organisational, social aspects) competencies (Bowers, 2000).  
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Technical competencies are specific to particular teams (e.g., execute a defence strategy for 
soccer team or setting up a local command centre for fire-fighters) and do not generalise over 
teams. Non-technical competencies tend to be more generic, although for particular professions 
certain non-technical team skills may be more important than others (e.g., ‘problem diagnosis’ 
for a soccer team versus a fire-fighter team). An example of a non-technical competency 
framework for a particular profession (civil cockpit crews) is provided by the NOTECHS 
project (Van Avermaete, 1998) specifying non-technical competencies and associated 
behaviours (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The NOTECHS framework 
Categories Elements 
Cooperation Team building and maintaining 
 Considering others 
 Supporting others 
 Conflict solving 
Leadership and management  Use of authority 
Skills Maintaining standards 
 Planning and coordinating 
 Workload management 
Situation Awareness System awareness 
 Environmental awareness 
 Assessment of time 
Decision Making Problem definition/diagnosis 
 Option generation 
 Risk assessment 
 Outcome review 
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2.1 The MilNOTECHS framework 
MilNOTECHS was introduced with the DHC (Defence Helicopter Command, in The 
Netherlands in 2011. In 2012 it will also be implemented by the fixed wing transport 
squadrons.  Plans exist for the introduction into the F-16 community as well. 
  
MilNOTECHS is based on the civil variant, NOTECHS. Even though MilNOTECHS is a 
modification by the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF), 90% of the original content has 
been retained. Most changes have been made within the Situation Awareness (SA) and Decision 
Making (DM) categories. Several DM elements have been moved to the SA category. This has 
been done to create a clear boundary between SA and DM; reserving the actual making of the 
decision for DM, everything else, even 'outcome review' is SA.  
 
Where the original NOTECHS suggested working with bipolar ratings (acceptable versus 
unacceptable), the MilNOTECHS adheres to the standard RNLAF grading system: 
 
N (Not graded/demonstrated); example behaviour has not been displayed and was not 
applicable in the graded situation. 
U (Unsatisfactory/Unable); example behaviour has not been displayed and this causes an 
unsafe situation. 
F (Fair); example behaviour is regularly not displayed and this causes possible risks for flight 
safety. 
G (Good); example behaviour is regularly displayed and flight safety risks do not arise or are 
neutralized in time. 
E (Excellent); example behaviour is continually displayed and enhances flight safety 
considerably. 
  
2.2 Aeronautical Decision Making; Training and Tools 
Several strategies (often embodied in mnemonics or acronyms) have been suggested to support 
the processes and procedures concerned with Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM), for 
example SHOR (Stimulus, Hypothesis, Options, Response) (Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Detect 
change, Estimate significance, Set safety objectives, Identify Options, Do, Evaluate) (Murray, 
1997). Li and Harris (2005a) undertook a study to identify the best ADM mnemonic-based 
methods for training military pilots in decision making SHOR was rated as being the best ADM 
mnemonic in time-limited and critical, urgent situations. DESIDE was regarded as superior for 
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knowledge-based decisions that required more comprehensive considerations but also had more 
time available.  
 
In a later study, Li & Harris (2008) provided a short ADM training course to fighter pilots and 
evaluated their decision-making skills during a series of emergency situations presented in a 
full-flight simulator on the dimensions of situation assessment, risk management, and response 
time. Improvements were found in the quality of pilots’ situation assessment and risk 
management, often at the expense of response speed. Li and Harris concluded that ADM is 
trainable and effective in improving decision making. 
 
Instead of improving individual pilot decision making in emergency situations, the Dynamic 
Team Training (DTT) experiment aims to improve team decision making in a tactical 
environment, using the DESIDE acronym. The tactical mission scenarios were set up in such a 
way that most of the decisions required comprehensive considerations. The scenarios also 
provided participants enough time to apply the acronym or provided opportunities for the 
participants to create time. Øvretveit (1993) found that effective decision-making is central to 
successful multidisciplinary teamwork; that improvements come from paying attention to both 
formal and informal features of team organisation; and that suitable formal decision-making 
procedures are necessary for teams to survive. The strength of the DESIDE acronym is the 
inclusion of a deliberate decision whether or not to alter your mission objectives and to monitor 
if your actions have the expected results. For those reasons, DESIDE, not SHOR, was the 
selected ADM tool. 
 
2.3 The DESIDE acronym 
The DESIDE acronym can be used to improve the quality of decision making when sufficient 
time is available by following these six steps: 
 
1. Detect change: monitor for any change that might influence the expected outcome of the 
flight. 
2. Estimate the significance: estimate the significance of the change. With minimal risk a 
small corrective action might be sufficient. Otherwise you need to proceed to the next step. 
3. Set safety objectives: modify your original objectives to obtain a safe/desired mission 
outcome. Be aware of the tendency to continue your flight as planned because you do not 
want to abandon your original flight objectives. A helpful tool to counter this tendency is to 
‘look ahead to how you might look back’ when the risk leads to encountered danger  
(e.g.: loss of aircraft or lives). 
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4. Identify options: generate, evaluate and select an option that can successfully achieve the 
safety objectives. 
5. Do: execute the option you selected in the previous step. 
6. Evaluate: evaluate if your actions are achieving the safety objectives as expected. 
 
The DESIDE acronym can be used in, for example, an office setting. However, it was designed 
specifically for a dynamic, aviation related environment. Dynamic decision making is decision 
making under conditions which require a series of decisions, where the decisions are not 
independent, where the state of the world changes, both autonomously and as a consequence of 
the decision maker's actions, and where the decisions have to be made in real time (Brehmer, 
1992). 
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3 Method 
The Dynamic Team Training (DTT) experiment followed a randomized groups, repeated 
measures design. Participants were selected from the community around the ‘Falcon 4.0’ 
military flight simulation game. This community frequently organizes realistic virtual F-16 
fighter jet campaigns. Members are familiar with F-16 controls and performing team based 
tactical sorties. Selected participants were all male, on average 44 years old and had 
accumulated an average of 1750 virtual flying hours. A total of 24 participants were divided 
over 2x (control and experimental) 4 teams of three persons. Each team consisted of two 
“fighter jet” pilots and one supporting Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operator. Participants 
were randomly selected but roles were divided over the participants according to their 
experience and skill to form optimally functioning teams. This information was collected 
beforehand from all of the participants. The most experienced participants would fulfil the role 
of Flight Lead, the least experienced participants the role of UAS operator. Participants with 
moderate experience would fulfil the role of Wingman. The level of experience was rated 
against the total number of simulated flying hours on the Falcon 4.0 game or previous versions 
of this game. A number of simulator runs to test these gamers was organized in which a former 
RNLAF weapons instructor pilot evaluated aircraft and weapon systems handling and (tactical) 
procedural knowledge. His evaluation was used to decide if the level of performance of the 
participants was adequate for the experiment.  
 
In the experiment, each team was asked to perform a set of five tactical fighter jet missions. 
These missions all started with the two F-16s on the runway and the UAV loitering in the 
mission area. In the 20 to 35 minute missions that followed ground targets had to found, 
identified and destroyed, air threats had to be attacked or avoided, and unforeseen technical, 
tactical and weather issues had to be dealt with. In the control condition (CRM), the teams 
received a short classical Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, similar in content to the 
CRM training received in the RNLAF. Topics covered in this training were; human error, 
fatigue, stress, cooperation, communication, cooperation, situation awareness and decision 
making. Some topics, such as Fatigue, were only discussed briefly given their relevance to this 
particular experiment. In the experimental condition (DESIDE), the teams received a short 
presentation about the concept of CRM but only the topics ‘situation awareness’ and ‘decision 
making’ were covered in the same detail as in the control groups. The remaining training time 
focused on the use of the DESIDE decision making tool in a team setting and an explanation of 
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some typical biases and decision making errors. The first two letters of the acronym, D(etect) 
and E(stimate) were to be used on an individual basis. If a pilot or the UAS operator estimated 
there was a consequence for the mission due to a detected change, they would communicate this 
to the team. For example, in one of the missions a mobile target had moved from its briefed 
position, a field, into a populated area. Attacking this target in this position would breach the 
Rules of Engagement. The UAS operator had the opportunity to spot this before the F-16 
reached the target area. His Detect should be; target has moved into populated area. The next 
step, Estimate the consequences for the mission, should be; due to the Rules of Engagement this 
is not a valid target as long as it remains in this position. After communicating this message the 
remaining letters could be dealt with by the team in a way they considered appropriate. To 
prevent memory issues during the missions, all participants were encouraged to use a DESIDE 
checklist.  
 
After the classroom training, team training continued with a series of five missions. Following 
each mission, the teams received feedback on their competencies. During the mission execution, 
the quality of the team performance, in particular their situation awareness and decision making, 
was monitored and rated using MilNOTECHS behavioural markers. 
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3.1 Experimental set up 
The experiment was administered using F-16 research simulation facilities. Participants were 
screened on former formal Crew Resource Management (CRM) training and if applicable, 
excluded from the experiment. A good comparison could thereby be made between the effects 
of the different decision making tools. The teams of three participants would receive 
instructions and training on location before familiarization with the simulator and subsequent 
mission execution. The experiment consisted of a fighter jet campaign with a total of five 
separate missions. Every mission included an extensive briefing (to optimally prepare 
participants for the mission at hand) and debriefing (to facilitate the learning process). 
Instructions, training, familiarization and mission execution would, including a total of one hour 
of breaks, take up a total of 8 hours and 45 minutes.   
 
Because the experiment would run for a prolonged period of time (up to several weeks) and 
participants were recruited from the same pool, there was a risk that teams that had undergone 
the experiment in the initial stages would inform later teams. To guard against this, participants 
were asked to keep strict secrecy about the training and missions until the experiment was 
completed.  
 
3.2 Simulators and data collection instruments 
To test the quality of the decision making process and the effects of that on the mission 
performance the experiment will be performed on flight simulators. The NLR simulator 
facilities ‘Fighter 4 Ship’ and ‘Multi UAV Simulation Test bed (MUST)’ were used. The same 
simulators could also be used for future validation on professional fighter pilots. The NLR 
Fighter 4-Ship (F4S) simulator was used for the tactical fighter jet (F-16) simulation. A 
(Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)) UAS would be simulated using the NLR Multi 
UA Simulation Test bed (MUST). Both simulators were connected to the same tactical 
environment to enable the participants to receive inputs from each other, cooperate and work 
together as a team.   
 
3.2.1 NLR Fighter 4-Ship (F4S) 
The Fighter 4 Ship (F4S) is a generic fighter jet research simulator based at the RNLAF Volkel 
Air Force base that is comprised of four separate fighter jet simulators that are networked 
together to enable tactical team operations with up to four ships. For the DTT experiment the 
simulators were configured as F-16 fighter jets. F4S supports the whole mission-cycle by 
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integrating the mission support systems, used in actual fast-jet operations by the Royal 
Netherlands Air force (RNLAF). The Fighter 4 Ship simulator is interoperable with the NLR 
MUST simulator that simulates a UAS ground control station, enabling the F-16 and UAS 
operators to work together for enhanced situational awareness (SA) and share certain tasks such 
as Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). 
 
 
 
3.2.2 NLR Multi UAV Simulator Test bed (MUST) 
The MUST is a desktop UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) simulator developed within NLR that 
facilitates UAS control by a single operator. The MUST was configured for this research to 
perform as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAS (comparable to the General 
Atomics MQ-1B predator) with reconnaissance capabilities only. Because the MUST UAS 
simulator is interoperable with the F4S simulator, missions can be accomplished by 
coordination and sharing of information between the F-16 flight and the UAS operator.  
 
3.3 Briefing/Debriefing 
All briefing and debriefing was performed using the mission support systems that are used in 
actual fast-jet operations by the Royal Netherlands Air force (RNLAF). This facilitated the 
comparison of results from the study among the Falcon 4.0 participants with future further 
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confirmation studies involving actual RNLAF F-16 fighter pilots. All briefing documents were 
prepared in close collaboration with a former F-16 weapons instructor pilot to ensure all 
necessary information was present for effective operations and contained campaign information, 
target folders and mission charts for both F-16 crew and UAS operator.  
 
3.4 Communications 
To facilitate the crucial team communication among the F-16 flight crew and between the UAS 
operator, a VHF communication system representative of the actual communication system 
currently in use in the RNLAF was used for all communications.  
 
3.5 Missions 
The dynamic team training experiment used preplanned events as a trigger for the use of the 
decision making tool (either CRM or DESIDE). These triggers were built into the missions that 
had to be executed in the form of malfunctions (fuel leaks), unexpected occurrences (bad 
weather, moving targets) and rare deviations from normal operations (red force defector). All 
five missions were designed in cooperation with an experienced weapons instructor pilot to 
contain all desired tactical elements and appropriate difficulty level. Two examples of missions 
are presented below:  
 
Mission 3: Guard Fighter Area Of Responsibility (FAOR).  
In this scenario, two threats appear. First, an air threat is reported by AWACS. Second, a 
Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM), located close to a church will be observable by the UAV. 
When the UAV detects the TBM, the HQ communicates the attack order: to avoid collateral 
damage, the attack may commence only if the TBM starts moving out of residential area. An 
engagement with the air threats should be avoided because, as briefed, the TBM is a higher 
priority target and attacking it would involve less risk than attacking the air threats. 
 
Mission 5: Attack SA-6 (target 1) and bridge (target 2). 
In this final scenario a SA-6 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system is the last tactical asset 
available to the enemy. If this asset is taken out, the war is won, and the second target (bridge) 
won’t have to be taken out. The UAV detects the SA-6 but the target is concealed by a low level 
cloud deck. Target 2 (bridge) is not concealed by bad weather. The team has to decide on 
whether or not the SA-6 can be taken out, whether or not to take out the bridge, and how this 
can be done without causing unnecessary damage.  
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Decisions such as these two examples are regarded as tactical decisions. In these scenarios, the 
DM Process Quality was primarily associated with the following behavioural markers: 
Environmental Awareness, Problem Definition, Option Generation and Risk Assessment. 
Teams were asked to cooperate as much as possible and practical. Cooperation within the five 
missions consisted mainly of sharing information (on threats, targets, environmental conditions) 
and using this information together to maximize mission success with a minimum level of risk. 
 
3.6 Data collection 
Data was collected in a twofold manner. The 
quality of the decision making process was 
measured on the basis of observations 
through standardized observation criteria by a 
training expert and a Subject Manner Expert 
(SME) on tactical fighter jet missions. The 
training expert measured the quality of the 
decision making process by using the 
MilNOTECHS method, specifically designed to measure non-technical skills among military 
pilots. The SME provided relevant insights (Instructor Pilot (IP) ratings) into the quality from a 
tactical point of view (e.g. risks taken).  
 
One or more decisive moments were created per executed mission to ensure the participants as a 
team had to make a tactical decision on the course to follow. This would provide fixed reference 
points to allow the instructors to rate the performances of the teams. The focus was on the 
decisions made at these decisive moments, but decisions and actions before and after the 
decisive moments would also be taken into account as they could be of influence as well. This 
measure was used as input for the first hypothesis. 
 
The SME also provided a measure of the mission success from a tactical point of view for the 
overall mission, as well as for a subset of mission elements (e.g. flight path taken, sub goals 
met). This measure was used as input for the second hypothesis. 
 
As measure of the DM process quality a composite of two MilNOTECHS subcategories were 
used; ‘Situation Awareness’ and ‘Decision Making’. The average ratings on these items for the 
team on every separate mission were used as input for GLM/repeated measures ANOVA 
(SPSS).  
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4 Results 
The experiment revealed a learning effect on the quality of the decision making process (F = 
11.57, p < 0.05; see Figure 1). The experimental group receiving the DESIDE acronym decision 
making process tool showed better progress on decision making process quality than the control 
group that received a standard CRM decision making training (F = 9.81, p < 0.01; Bonferroni 
post hoc tests).  
The average decision making process quality over the five missions did not differ significantly 
between groups: M = 1.84 for DESIDE versus M = 1.41 for CRM (F = 2.27, p = 0.19).  
On individual missions 3 and 4, the DESIDE group received higher mean scores on decision 
making process quality than the control group (1.98 versus 1.44 on mission 3; 2.19 versus 1.93 
on mission 4). These differences are not significant. However, for the last mission, the 
difference between the experimental group (M = 2.38) and control group (M = 1.06) is evident 
(t = 2.53, p < 0.05).  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean decision making process quality for experimental and control group 
(1= unsatisfactory, 4 = excellent) over mission 1 to 5 
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5 Discussion 
The results, although hypothesized, are remarkable since they are found with a sample size of 
only four teams per condition. A significantly different learning curve (Figure 1) in decision 
making process quality was found for the DESIDE group in comparison to the control (CRM) 
group. However, no significant difference between the average decision making process quality 
in the control and experimental groups was found. With the limited amount of time available, 
this result was not unexpected. 
 
Because the experiment had to be performed over the course of one day, only limited time was 
available for training and learning to use the decision making tool. The Falcon 4.0 gamers were 
not able to apply the decision making tool to the full extent, i.e., they did not overtly complete 
the decision process using all the letters of the acronym. 
 
If we hypothesize that the differences between the two learning curves continues with 
subsequent training missions, this would result in a significant difference in decision making 
process quality. Using the DESIDE acronym to increase the decision making process quality 
therefore seems promising. 
 
Limited overt use of the DESIDE tool may be attributed to high workload, caused by the effects 
of flying on a different and more realistic simulator, and executing more realistic task sets 
(compared to Falcon 4 devices and missions). Another factor that may have contributed to high 
workload was the required ‘train as you fight’ regime compared to the more ‘if there is chance 
to engage an air threat, don’t bother about tasking orders, rules of engagement, fuel levels, or 
mutual support and go for it’ work practice in gaming.  
 
Observations by the instructors do support a high workload explanation. When overloaded, 
communication often is one of the first human capabilities to disappear (Kleinman & Serfaty, 
1989). The gamers were able to keep on flying and performing their individual tasks, but were 
not always able to communicate their intentions and decision making considerations, which 
would include using the DESIDE tool. Instructors also noted occasional signs of mental 
overload, manifesting itself in physical (heavy breathing) and cognitive (acting disorderly) 
forms.  
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The observations of the instructors, however, are not supported by the self-ratings of the 
participants on the Rating Scale Mental effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) as figure 2 illustrates. An 
RSME score of 70 indicates “effortful” which should not generate overload.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean RSME for experimental and control group over the five missions 
(scale from 0-150; 40 = somewhat effortful; 85 = very effortful; 115 = tremendously effortful) 
 
Even though the decision making tool was not applied to the full extent, a marked difference is 
seen between the DESIDE and the control group on the latter mission, in particular in the 
ambiguous circumstances of mission 5. By giving the participants a tool to actively guide them 
through the decision making process, the quality of the decision making process increased. Even 
though high workload often seemed to prevent participants applying the full acronym during the 
missions, the first letter (D for Detect) was used many times. This could be seen as a 
considerable increase in SA compared to the control group in which most of these changes in 
the environment were not detected (as far as apparent from subsequent behaviour). A 
considerable part of the increase in quality of the DM process can therefore be attributed to an 
increase in SA. 
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Several control variables have been measured to control for and help interpret the results: 
participant background characteristics, the Crew Alertness Rating Scale, the workload scale 
RSME and Stanford Sleepiness Scale. Full covariate analysis was not feasible due to the small 
sample size. These variables do not reveal any clear explanation for the effects. Participant 
background differs considerably between the 24 participants, obviously a much more 
heterogeneous group than the F-16 pilot community, but differences are not strong among the 
groups. Workload experienced (RSME) is not different between groups, although the DESIDE 
group reported significantly higher levels of sleepiness, higher experienced difficulty, and 
higher experienced stress levels after each mission. These self-reported ratings may indicate 
either a higher motivation level in the DESIDE group (not observed as such by the instructors) 
or may be the result of the additional task load resulting from (trying) to use the DESIDE tool. 
 
For practical reasons the participants in this study were Falcon 4.0 gamers, who are quite 
knowledgeable with F-16 controls and mission flows. But they are not representative for the 
average fighter pilot. The DESIDE concept and the results of the study have been presented to 
operational pilots to acquire an indication of face validity of the concept. The F-16 pilots (one 
weapons instructor pilot, one experienced pilot, and one recently graduated pilot) received the 
same DESIDE decision making briefing and executed the first and fifth mission. After both 
missions they were debriefed by the same weapons instructor pilot used during the experiment. 
The fighter pilots indicated that, in their opinion, the DESIDE acronym could be a beneficial 
factor in further establishing the ‘speak up culture’. This will especially benefit novice fighter 
pilots that, due to the practice of sharing only important information over the busy radio 
channels, may be uncertain to determine whether information is irrelevant and consequently 
may not share relevant information in a timely manner. Using the DESIDE tool will make it 
more acceptable for all to have inexperienced pilots expressing a ‘detect’, even when the flight 
lead may decide to ignore the information. Furthermore, novice pilots may experience less 
difficulty in using a new way of decision making.  
The reported downside of the DESIDE acronym was the cognitive load put on the pilot. The 
cognitive strain provided by deliberate and active use of a decision making tool might be 
handled better by an experienced pilot, who has more spare cognitive capacity for additional 
tasks. In that respect the experienced pilots would be the more appropriate target group for a 
DESIDE training.  
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For novice pilots learning to use the DESIDE tool, a role shifting paradigm might be applied. It 
may be good training value in its own right to take up the role of a UAS operator in a mission, 
and at the same time (after UAS familiarization), learning to apply the DESIDE tool in a team 
setting. The relatively low workload for the UAS operator may enable the novice fighter pilot to 
apply the DESIDE tool in a less demanding context. 
 
Alternatively, training scenario’s may be set up in such a way that (experienced) UAS operators 
joining a training mission would be more likely to detect and/or estimate consequences, and 
therefore initiate the DESIDE process. This would also ease the load on novice pilots. 
 
The DESIDE DM tool could also help in creative problem solving and preventing Plan 
Continuation Errors (PCE) (Orasanu, et al. 2001). It is often difficult for humans to take a step 
back from an engaging task. This may prevent the execution of a conscious decision making 
process, possibly leading to a PCE. Even if the application of DESIDE would not lead to better 
mission quality (accomplish mission goals) it will most probably lead to better cost-benefit 
analyses due to the deliberate risk analysis and option generation steps engrained in the 
DESIDE process. That results in mission goals being accomplished with a minimum of risk.  
 
Subsequent research should establish the ecological validity of the results. Does the effect also 
occur when training (novice) pilots and what are the effects after a prolonged period of training? 
While novice pilots may appear to be appropriate target audience for DESIDE training, they 
may also be susceptible for the same workload effects as the Falcon 4.0 gamers. The training 
method needs to be adapted to address this.  
 
It is expected that the learning curve for the decision making process would continue to rise 
when the participants receive more training over a prolonged period of time in future studies. 
Also, application of the (complete) DM tool will probably increase in a more familiar 
environment, and therefore require lower work load. 
 
Another aspect of interest for further study is the scope of applicability and the long-term effects 
of the DESIDE tool. DESIDE has been designed for structuring decision support for problems 
that allow a few minutes to be solved which fits the processes requiring team co-ordination in 
this study. Which type of teams, or missions would benefit by DESIDE and which would not? 
Also, when novice pilots learn to structure decision making using DESIDE, will it eventually 
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internalise? Will the problem solving strategy routinize, become more implicit and therefore 
expedite the decision making process to such a level that it also enhances the (individual) 
decisions that need to be made in a shorter (e.g. ten second) time frame? 
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6 Conclusion 
It has been found that the DESIDE tool for decision making is promising for teams in a military 
context. Even though mission effectiveness did not improve, usage of the tool did generate 
improved decision making process quality in teams. This effect was found with gamers 
performing air operation missions with an F-16 two-ship and a UAS operator. Further study is 
needed to investigate the validity of the effect and the scope of applicability of the DESIDE tool 
for team training in the professional military environment. 
 
Under circumstances where time and mental resources are available, it seems beneficial to use 
the structured approach of the team decision making tool in order to enhance the shared 
situational awareness, to stimulate pilots to follow-through all elements of decision making 
(including the usually forgotten “evaluation”), and to facilitate a “speak up” culture among 
novice pilots.  
 
Although it is not clear yet that DESIDE will also increase mission performance after prolonged 
experience, it can be expected that (operational) risk management will benefit during the flights. 
On the basis of the findings so far, the method could be used in practice on trainee or novice 
pilots that could benefit most from the structure, during situations where creative problem 
solving is required and time is available. Experienced pilots, not trained in DESIDE, may find 
the method too disrupting to their normal operation flow and intuitive decision making process, 
but they too, will benefit from the shared situational awareness with other (novice) pilots. 
Furthermore, it will protect experienced pilots from missing steps in the decision making 
process due to stress or disruption of the thought process. However, during situations where 
split second decisions need to be made, falling back on thoroughly trained actions (manoeuvres 
and tactics) is preferable over the time consuming structured approach. Future research should 
determine whether the method (and to what level of training in the method) will be suited for 
the grey area in between ample and little time.     
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